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THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND THE 
JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE SCALIA 
BRADFORD R. CLARK* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Commentators generally regard federalism and separation of powers as 
distinct features of the constitutional structure.  In reality, these doctrines were 
designed to work together to further the same goals: to avoid tyranny and to 
preserve individual liberty.  Professor Thomas Merrill overlooks this 
connection in his attempt to explain the Supreme Court’s decision making 
process under Chief Justice William Rehnquist.1  Professor Merrill maintains 
that there have been two Rehnquist Courts: one from 1986 to 1994, and 
another from 1994 to the present.  In Professor Merrill’s view, the first 
Rehnquist Court focused on social issues—such as abortion, affirmative action, 
and school prayer—with “relatively few important doctrinal innovations in 
these areas.”2  The second Rehnquist Court, by contrast, focused on 
“constitutional federalism, including the scope of federal power under the 
Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Tenth 
Amendment limitations on federal power, and state sovereign immunity from 
private lawsuits reflected in the Eleventh Amendment.”3  Unlike the first 
Rehnquist Court, the second “has generated a number of important 
innovations.”4 
Professor Merrill considers four hypotheses about judicial behavior in an 
attempt to explain these differences, including what he calls “the internal 
strategic actor hypothesis.”5  Applying this hypothesis, Professor Merrill 
suggests that Justice Antonin Scalia made a strategic choice to shift his 
 
* Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.  I thank Bill Kelley, John 
Manning, and Jon Molot for insightful comments and suggestions.  I also thank John Kammerer 
and Brian Wesoloski for excellent research assistance. 
 1. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary 
Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569 (2003). 
 2. Id. at 570. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 572. 
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priorities from social issues to constitutional federalism circa 1994.6  This 
hypothesis is unpersuasive.  As Professor Merrill acknowledges, Justice 
“Scalia had little occasion to consider questions of constitutional federalism 
before he was appointed to the Supreme Court.”7  Thus, it is not surprising that 
Justice Scalia did not arrive on the Court with a full-fledged federalism agenda 
or that he preferred to wait for briefing and argument before reaffirming an 
important precedent like Hans v. Louisiana.8  From the beginning, however, 
Justice Scalia has been a strong proponent of constitutional federalism.  In fact, 
with only one arguable exception,9 Justice Scalia has voted to uphold the 
constitutional prerogatives of the states in every major federalism case decided 
since he joined the Court. 
Professor Merrill presents a variety of “circumstantial evidence” to support 
his thesis that Justice Scalia made a strategic choice to favor federalism in 
1994.10  None of this evidence, however, withstands analysis.  In fact, much of 
the evidence that Professor Merrill presents actually undercuts his hypothesis 
and confirms Justice Scalia’s long-standing commitment to constitutional 
federalism.  In the end, Professor Merrill fails to marshal any persuasive 
evidence to support his claim. 
Justice Scalia does appear to have an “agenda” of sorts in federalism cases, 
although not the one that Professor Merrill suggests.  Justice Scalia’s goal in 
these cases is to uphold the original constitutional structure in order to respect 
the Founders’ constitutional design and to protect individual liberty.  Professor 
Merrill acknowledges Justice Scalia’s interest in the constitutional separation 
of powers,11 but fails to recognize the connection between separation of 
powers and federalism.  Neither feature of the constitutional structure was 
meant to be an end in itself.  Rather, both separation of powers and federalism 
were designed to check government power and to secure individual liberty.  As 
James Madison explained in urging ratification, because the Constitution both 
divides and separates power, “a double security arises to the rights of the 
people.”12  Thus, even though Justice “Scalia had little occasion to consider 
questions of constitutional federalism before he was appointed to the Supreme 
Court,”13 it is not surprising that he quickly came to regard federalism—like 
separation of powers—as an essential element of the Founders’ constitutional 
design. 
 
 6. See Merrill, supra note 1, at 601-20. 
 7. Id. at 609. 
 8. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).  See infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text. 
 9. Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987). 
 10. Merrill, supra note 1, at 609-17. 
 11. Id. at 604. 
 12. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 13. Merrill, supra note 1, at 609. 
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II.  MERRILL’S EVIDENCE 
Professor Merrill produces no persuasive evidence to support his claim that 
“Justice Scalia has behaved strategically in seeking to influence the entire 
course of the Rehnquist Court over the last eight years.”14  Professor Merrill 
relies exclusively on “circumstantial evidence” to support his hypothesis.15  
Upon analysis, however, that evidence not only fails to support, but generally 
tends to refute, Professor Merrill’s account. 
First, Professor Merrill finds that nothing in Justice Scalia’s background 
suggests an orientation favoring “devolution of power from the federal 
government to the states.”16  Specifically, Professor Merrill notes that Justice 
Scalia’s “entire professional career had been in federal service or in teaching 
federal administrative law at national law schools.”17  The mere fact, however, 
that Justice Scalia had few occasions to consider federalism questions before 
joining the Supreme Court yields no evidence—circumstantial or otherwise—
of his views on the topic.  Similarly, the fact that then-Professor Scalia’s 
scholarly interests lay elsewhere provides no basis for predicting how he would 
later rule on federalism questions as a judge sworn to uphold the Constitution. 
Second, Professor Merrill notes that Justice Scalia considered the question 
of federal sovereign immunity early in his academic career, and recognized 
that the doctrine “has little claim either to historical legitimacy or practical 
efficacy.”18  According to Professor Merrill, “[s]omeone harboring these views 
about federal sovereign immunity would be unlikely to give an unqualified 
endorsement to state sovereign immunity.”19  The very article that Professor 
Merrill cites, however, draws a sharp distinction between the legitimacy of 
federal and state sovereign immunity by differentiating “‘domestic’ and 
‘foreign’ sovereign immunity.”20  According to Professor Scalia, “foreign” 
immunity provides “exemption from the compulsory process of another 
sovereign,” whereas “domestic” immunity refers to “exemption of the state’s 
executive or legislative branches from the compulsory process of its own 
judiciary.”21  Thus, as Professor Scalia explained, the “eleventh amendment to 
the Constitution embodies only that ‘foreign’ immunity, protecting the states 
from being sued before federal tribunals by citizens of other states or 
 
 14. Id. at 604. 
 15. Id. at 609-17. 
 16. Id. at 609. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Merrill, supra note 1, at 610. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative 
Action: Some Conclusions From the Public-Lands Cases, 68 MICH. L. REV. 867, 886 (1970). 
 21. Id. 
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nations.”22  The federal government, by contrast, has only “domestic” 
immunity from suit in federal court. 
It is true, as Professor Merrill suggests, that Professor Scalia was critical of 
federal sovereign immunity.  Such criticism, however, contrasts sharply with 
Professor Scalia’s apparent willingness to embrace broad state sovereign 
immunity under the Constitution.  For example, Professor Scalia criticized the 
Supreme Court’s early practice of restricting Eleventh Amendment immunity 
to cases in which the state itself was the party of record.  According to 
Professor Scalia, “[i]t eventually and inevitably became clear that the ‘party of 
record’ test . . . could not continue to be applied to the eleventh-amendment 
cases without flouting the clear intent of the Constitution.”23  Professor 
Scalia’s only lament was that this necessary expansion of state immunity 
spread to federal immunity as well.  Thus, Professor Scalia complained that, 
during the nineteenth century, “the Supreme Court treated cases arising under 
the eleventh amendment as involving essentially the same issue as those cases 
which dealt with the ‘domestic’ immunity of the United States itself.”24  
“Consequently,” Professor Scalia explained, “a change made to protect the 
states from the federal courts, as the Constitution required, had the very 
different effect of insulating the federal government from the federal courts, 
thereby casting a shadow upon the entire field of nonstatutory review.”25  
These observations reveal that, as early as 1970, Professor Scalia believed that 
state sovereign immunity had a greater claim to constitutional legitimacy than 
federal sovereign immunity.26 
Third, Professor Merrill examines “Justice Scalia’s pre-judicial attitude” 
with respect to “the more general topic of federalism.”27  Specifically, Merrill 
discusses a four-page speech that Professor Scalia delivered to the Federalist 
Society in 1982.28  Professor Scalia cautioned those in attendance against 
“generalized hostility towards national law which has become a common 
feature of conservative thought.”29  Professor Merrill apparently (mis)reads 
this speech as hostile to constitutional federalism and treats it as circumstantial 
evidence of Justice Scalia’s subsequent strategic behavior on the Supreme 
Court.  Professor Scalia, however, actually endorsed a broad vision of 
federalism, properly understood.  He explained: 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 887. 
 24. Id. at 886. 
 25. Scalia, supra note 20, at 888 (emphasis added). 
 26. See Peter J. Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal Perspective, 89 VA. L. 
REV. 1, 35 (2003) (discussing Professor Scalia’s view that state sovereign immunity corresponds 
to foreign state immunity under the law of nations). 
 27. Merrill, supra note 1, at 610. 
 28. Antonin Scalia, The Two Faces of Federalism, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 19 (1982). 
 29. Id. at 20. 
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In meeting to discuss federalism, we have to bear in mind that it is a form of 
government midway between two extremes.  At one extreme, the autonomy, 
the disunity, the conflict of independent states; at the other, the uniformity, the 
inflexibility, the monotony of one centralized government.  Federalism is 
meant to be a compromise between the two.30 
Thus, while recognizing the limited nature of federal power, Professor Scalia 
encouraged conservatives to use such power to achieve conservative ends.  
“When liberals are in power they do not shrink from using the federal structure 
for what they consider to be sound governmental goals.  But when 
conservatives take charge, the most they hope to do is to keep anything from 
happening.”31 
Professor Scalia’s point was not that conservatives should disregard the 
constitutional limits of federal power.  Rather, he merely suggested that they 
should use the federal government’s undisputed power in constructive ways.  
For example, Professor Scalia cited “economic regulation” as “an area in 
which it is clear that the Founding Fathers meant the federal government to 
restrain the centrifugal tendencies of the states.”32  Professor Scalia specifically 
mentioned the possibility of preempting burdensome local cable regulations in 
order to implement a national free market policy.33  Such a proposal suggests 
no hostility to constitutional federalism.  As Professor Scalia emphasized: 
I do not think the most dyed-in-the-wool anti-federalist among you would deny 
that the federal government has power to establish the regulatory environment 
for cable—which is, realistically, part of an interstate delivery system that 
brings information and entertainment from the production studios of New York 
and California to the individual home.34 
In the end, what Professor Merrill regards as evidence of hostility to 
federalism is, in reality, nothing more than a policy preference as to how the 
federal government should exercise its limited constitutional power.  The mere 
fact that Professor Scalia urged federal protection of interstate cable operations 
tells us nothing about his view of Congress’s power to prohibit local handgun 
possession near schools35 or to commandeer state and local law enforcement 
officers.36  Justice Scalia’s subsequent resolution of these questions in favor of 
the states, however, is not surprising.  In 1982, Professor Scalia expressly 
rejected the “extreme” alternative of unlimited federal power and explained 
 
 30. Id. at 19. 
 31. Id. at 20. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Scalia, supra note 28, at 21. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 36. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
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that “[f]ederalism is meant to be a compromise between” the “autonomy . . . of 
independent states” and the “uniformity . . . of one centralized government.”37 
Fourth, Professor Merrill cites Justice Scalia’s refusal during his first year 
on the Supreme Court to reconsider Hans v. Louisiana.38  In Welch v. Texas 
Department of Highways and Public Transportation,39 Justice Scalia wrote: 
I find both the correctness of Hans as an original matter, and the feasibility, if 
it was wrong, of correcting it without distorting what we have done in tacit 
reliance upon it, complex enough questions that I am unwilling to address 
them in a case whose presentation focused on other matters.40 
It is not surprising that Justice Scalia found “the correctness of Hans” to be a 
difficult question necessitating full briefing and argument.  Even the most 
ardent proponent of constitutional federalism acknowledges that the immunity 
recognized in Hans must find its justification in sources beyond the text of the 
Eleventh Amendment.  For present purposes, however, the important point is 
that Justice Scalia resolved this question in favor of the states when it next 
came before the Court in 1989—well before the 1994 fault line Professor 
Merrill hypothesizes.  Accordingly, in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,41 
Justice Scalia voted to reaffirm Hans both on the basis of “the original 
meaning of the Constitution,” and as a matter of stare decisis.42 
Justice Scalia’s resolution of this issue presents a serious “problem[] of 
timing”43 for Professor Merrill’s thesis.  As Merrill acknowledges, by 1989, 
“Justice Scalia had undeniably crossed the Rubicon on whether Congress has 
power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment under its Article I powers, a 
proposition that forms one of the pillars of the federalism revolution of the 
second Rehnquist Court.”44  This means that Justice Scalia embraced state 
sovereign immunity at least five years before Professor Merrill hypothesizes 
that a strategic actor in Justice Scalia’s position would have made such a move. 
There is additional evidence that Justice Scalia was a strong proponent of 
constitutional federalism throughout his tenure on the Supreme Court.  For 
example, in his first year on the Court, Justice Scalia dissented in Tyler Pipe 
Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Department of Revenue,45 an otherwise 
routine negative Commerce Clause case.  In the most sustained and sweeping 
challenge to the doctrine in modern times, Justice Scalia argued that the 
negative Commerce Clause “drastically limits the States’ discretion” and “has 
 
 37. Scalia, supra note 28, at 19. 
 38. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
 39. 483 U.S. 468 (1987). 
 40. Id. at 496 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 41. 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
 42. Id. at 34  (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 43. Merrill, supra note 1, at 617. 
 44. Id. at 618. 
 45. 483 U.S. 232 (1987). 
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no basis in the Constitution.”46  According to Justice Scalia, the text of the 
Commerce Clause “is a charter for Congress, not the courts,” to ensure free 
trade among the states.47  Justice Scalia observed that the “pre-emption of state 
legislation would automatically follow, of course, if the grant of power to 
Congress to regulate interstate commerce were exclusive.”48  Justice Scalia 
rejected this reading, however, because unlike other provisions, “the language 
of the Commerce Clause gives no indication of exclusivity,”49 and “there is no 
correlative denial of power over commerce to the States in Art. I, § 10, as there 
is, for example, with the power to coin money or make treaties.”50  Justice 
Scalia also found that the “historical record provides no grounds” for the 
negative Commerce Clause.51  After reviewing the ratification debates, Justice 
Scalia thought “it beyond question that many ‘apprehensions’ would have been 
‘entertained’ if supporters of the Constitution had hinted that the Commerce 
Clause, despite its language, gave this Court the power it has since assumed.”52 
The same year, in Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, 
Inc.,53 Justice Scalia was the only Justice to refuse to borrow a federal statute 
of limitations and apply it to civil RICO actions.  Justice Scalia preferred to 
follow the Court’s earlier “practice of borrowing state statutes,” which he 
thought “in reality involved no borrowing at all.”54  Justice Scalia explained 
that “state statutes of limitations whose terms appear to cover federal statutory 
causes of action apply as a matter of state law to such claims,” and that 
“imposition of limitations periods on federal causes of action is within the 
States’ powers, if not preempted by Congress.”55 
A few years later, in Tafflin v. Levitt,56 Justice Scalia urged the Court to 
reconsider its earlier dictum suggesting that state courts could be deprived of 
concurrent jurisdiction to hear federal claims even in the absence of an explicit 
federal statutory command to that effect.  According to Justice Scalia, “[s]tate 
courts have jurisdiction over federal causes of action not because it is 
‘conferred’ upon them by the Congress,” but because the laws of the United 
 
 46. Id. at 254 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 47. Id. at 260. 
 48. Id. at 260-61. 
 49. Id. at 261. 
 50. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc., 483 U.S. at 261. 
 51. Id. at 263. 
 52. Id. at 264.  Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, has also called on the Court to 
abandon the negative Commerce Clause.  See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of 
Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The negative Commerce Clause 
has no basis in the text of the Constitution, makes little sense, and has proved virtually 
unworkable in application.”). 
 53. 483 U.S. 143 (1987). 
 54. Id. at 158 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 55. Id. at 161. 
 56. 493 U.S. 455 (1990). 
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States constitute the law of the land applicable in federal and state courts 
alike.57  Thus, in Justice Scalia’s view, it “takes an affirmative act of power 
under the Supremacy Clause” to deprive “state courts of their sovereign 
authority to adjudicate the law of the land.”58  Cases like Tyler Pipe, Malley-
Duff, and Tafflin demonstrate that, contrary to Professor Merrill’s assumption, 
Justice Scalia arrived on the Court with a strong commitment to upholding the 
states’ prerogatives under the original constitutional scheme. 
Fifth, Professor Merrill points to Justice Scalia’s “voting record in 
preemption cases” as “circumstantial evidence tending to suggest the strategic 
nature of [his] behavior on constitutional federalism.”59  He argues that 
a sincere federalist would not only support formal limits on congressional 
power and immunities for states from suit by private citizens grounded in 
federal law, but he or she would also want to interpret the preemptive effect of 
federal statutes narrowly, so as to leave as large an ambit of state regulatory 
authority as possible.60 
Yet, in Professor Merrill’s view, Justice Scalia consistently supports “broad 
interpretations of the preemptive scope of federal law.”61  Professor Merrill 
erroneously equates a commitment to upholding the constitutional division of 
power between the federal government and the states with an unyielding policy 
preference for state and local control.  As Professor Scalia’s 1982 speech to the 
Federalist Society illustrates, however, the Constitution’s rejection of “one 
centralized government”62 does not mean that the federal government should 
hesitate to act in those areas in which “the Founding Fathers meant the federal 
government to restrain the centrifugal tendencies of the states.”63 
Even putting aside Professor Merrill’s false premise, his analysis of Justice 
Scalia’s voting record in preemption cases suffers from significant 
methodological flaws.  Merrill argues that Justice Scalia is an insincere 
federalist because in certain cases “Justice Scalia has supported federal 
preemption, but either Chief Justice Rehnquist or Justice Thomas (both of 
whom are more consistent supporters of states’ rights) have voted against a 
 
 57. Id. at 469-70 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 58. Id. at 470.  The Court effectively adopted Justice Scalia’s approach a few months later in 
Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990).  See Michael E. Solimine, 
Rethinking Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 383, 385 (1991) (stating that “the 
Court in Donnelly, perhaps influenced by Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Tafflin,  seemed 
more concerned with textual exegesis than with policy concerns in determining if the 
presumption of concurrent jurisdiction was rebutted”). 
 59. Merrill, supra note 1, at 611. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Scalia, supra note 28, at 19. 
 63. Id. at 20. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE SCALIA 761 
finding of preemption.”64  The cases that Professor Merrill cites, however, 
could just as easily be characterized as evidence of Justice Scalia’s sincerity in 
federalism cases.  Thus, in most of these cases, Justice Scalia voted with either 
Chief Justice Rehnquist or Justice Thomas—both sincere federalists according 
to Professor Merrill.  If either of these “sincere” federalists found preemption, 
then there is no reason to question Justice Scalia’s motive in such cases.  
Moreover, Professor Merrill does not take into account the votes of Justices 
O’Connor and Kennedy.  Few would question Justice O’Connor’s sincerity 
when it comes to federalism,65 and Professor Merrill himself suggests that 
Justice Kennedy may be a “more ardent states’ rights advocate[], at least 
insofar as immunity from suit is concerned, than are” Justices O’Connor, 
Scalia, and Thomas.66  Thus, it is significant that either Justice O’Connor, or 
Justice Kennedy, or both, voted with Justice Scalia in almost every case that 
Merrill cites. 
Sixth, Professor Merrill notes that Justice Scalia issued no separate 
concurring opinions “in the Court’s post-Lopez federalism decisions.”67  
According to Merrill, this suggests that Justice Scalia “remains, at best, 
uninterested in issues of constitutional federalism.”68  This conclusion simply 
does not follow.  Justices typically use separate concurring opinions to express 
disagreement, however small, with the Court’s approach.  Thus, the absence of 
concurring opinions by Justice Scalia is much more likely to signal agreement 
rather than disinterest.  Consider the flag-burning cases, both of which were 
close 5-4 decisions.  In Texas v. Johnson69 and United States v. Eichman,70 
Justice Scalia joined Justice Brennan’s majority opinions without writing 
separately.  Before being elevated to the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia was not 
known for taking a particularly expansive view of the First Amendment.71  Yet 
no reasonable observer would conclude that Justice Scalia’s failure to issue 
separate opinions in the flag-burning cases indicates either disinterest in free 
speech issues or insincerity in voting to invalidate the statutes at issue. 
Seventh, Professor Merrill suggests that there is pronounced “tension 
between the new federalism and Justice Scalia’s methodological 
convictions.”72  For example, Professor Merrill asserts that “[b]oth the Tenth 
 
 64. Merrill, supra note 1, at 611-12 (emphasis added). 
 65. See id. at 608 n.142 and accompanying text (noting that Justice O’Connor had worked in 
state government and been active in state politics). 
 66. Id. at 611 n.158. 
 67. Id. at 612. 
 68. Id. 
 69. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
 70. 496 U.S. 310 (1990). 
 71. See, e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 72. Merrill, supra note 1, at 613. 
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Amendment’s anti-commandeering principle and the extension of the Eleventh 
Amendment to include actions in state court and before federal administrative 
agencies lack any foundation in the text of the Constitution.”73  He regards this 
as evidence of strategic voting because “[i]n other contexts, such as substantive 
due process and the dormant Commerce Clause, Justice Scalia has been 
scornful of judicial doctrines that have no perceived foundation in the 
constitutional text.”74  Professor Merrill’s argument rests on the false 
assumption that both sets of decisions require affirmative justification in the 
constitutional text.  The original Constitution and the Tenth Amendment, 
however, suggest that the states retain all powers not prohibited to them by the 
Constitution, and that the federal government possesses only those powers 
“delegated to the United States by the Constitution.”75  Thus, doctrines 
restricting state power (like substantive due process and the dormant 
Commerce Clause) must be grounded in the text of the Constitution.  Doctrines 
upholding state autonomy from federal interference, by contrast, frequently 
arise precisely because the Constitution is silent concerning the federal 
government’s power to act.76 
More fundamentally, Professor Merrill does not acknowledge that the text 
of the Constitution often fails to address matters implicit in the constitutional 
structure.  As Charles Black explained, it would be “intellectually satisfying,” 
but “not true,” to say that, for constitutional law, our legal culture “always 
purports to move on the basis of the interpretation of particular constitutional 
texts.”77  Although searching “the written text for its meaning in application to 
the presented case”78 is the prevailing means of constitutional interpretation, 
Professor Black demonstrated that “the method of inference from the structures 
and relationships created by the constitution in all its parts or in some principal 
part” also plays a significant role “in the development of our constitutional 
law.”79  Thus, even when “there is no constitutional text speaking to th[e] 
precise question,”80 the constitutional structure frequently suggests an answer.  
Professor Merrill does not question Justice Scalia’s sincerity in relying on the 
constitutional structure to decide separation of powers cases like Morrison v. 
Olson.81  There is no greater reason for doing so when Justice Scalia invokes 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 76. See Bradford R. Clark, Translating Federalism: A Structural Approach, 66 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1161, 1187-97 (1998). 
 77. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7-8 
(1969). 
 78. Id. at 5. 
 79. Id. at 7-8. 
 80. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997). 
 81. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).  See Merrill, supra note 1, at 605. 
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the constitutional structure to decide federalism cases like Printz v. United 
States.82 
Professor Merrill finds additional tension between “the new federalism and 
Justice Scalia’s methodological convictions” in several cases in which “the 
Rehnquist majority has engaged in a close analysis of whether Congress has 
made sufficient ‘findings’ to justify its exercise of legislative power” under the 
Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.83  According 
to Professor Merrill, this “process-based review entails an extensive foray into 
legislative history and would seem to implicate all of the dangers of 
illegitimacy and manipulation that Justice Scalia has cited in opposing the use 
of legislative history to construe ambiguous statutes.”84 
Here again, the “tension” that Professor Merrill identifies is more apparent 
than real.  As the Supreme Court made clear in United States v. Lopez,85 
“Congress normally is not required to make formal findings as to the 
substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce.”86  Although 
Congress made no findings to support the statute invalidated in Lopez, the 
Court suggested that such findings might be useful to the extent that they 
“enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question 
substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial 
effect was visible to the naked eye.”87  Five years later, the Court confirmed 
the limited role of congressional findings in United States v. Morrison.88  On 
this occasion, Congress made findings that sex-based violence affects interstate 
commerce, but the Court considered such findings insufficient to establish the 
constitutionality of the statute in question.89 
The Supreme Court’s limited use of congressional findings in Commerce 
Clause cases is fully consistent with Justice Scalia’s reluctance to use 
legislative history to determine the meaning of ambiguous statutory texts.  At 
most, the Court suggested that such findings might help the Court understand 
why Congress thought a particular statute fell within its constitutional power to 
enact.  As Morrison demonstrates, however, congressional findings do not 
relieve the Court of its independent obligation to ascertain the meaning of the 
operative constitutional provisions.  Textualists reject the use of legislative 
history as authoritative evidence of statutory meaning.90  Properly understood, 
 
 82. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 83. Merrill, supra note 1, at 613. 
 84. Id. at 614. 
 85. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 86. Id. at 562. 
 87. Id. at 563. 
 88. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 89. Id. at 614-15. 
 90. See John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673 
(1997). 
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however, textualism “does not require the blanket exclusion of legislative 
history from judicial consideration.”91  Rather, so long as courts do not use 
legislative history to “give agents of Congress the power to ‘say what the law 
is,’”92 such history “may add substantial value to the interpretive process by 
supplying a well-informed, contemporaneous account of the relevant 
background to the enactment.”93  Justice Scalia himself has relied on 
legislative history for just this purpose.94  Such reliance is consistent with the 
Rehnquist Court’s willingness to consider congressional findings for analogous 
purposes in cases like Lopez and Morrison. 
Eighth, Professor Merrill believes that “the content of the three states’ 
rights opinions [Justice Scalia] has been assigned to write for the five-Justice 
majority”95 is “consistent with the hypothesis that Justice Scalia’s support for 
the Rehnquist majority in these cases is strategic.”96  Although acknowledging 
that such judgments are “necessarily subjective,” Professor Merrill’s 
impression is that “these opinions reflect relatively little enthusiasm or 
engagement with the immediate question at hand—constitutional 
federalism.”97  For example, Professor Merrill characterizes Justice Scalia’s 
opinion in Printz v. United States98 as “listless and defensive.”99  He maintains 
that Scalia’s “otherwise wooden opinion becomes animated only when 
discussing a structural reason for invalidating federal laws commandeering 
state officers, namely, that this ‘shatter[s]’ the principle of the unitary 
executive, thereby permitting Congress to reduce the power of the 
President.”100 
As an initial matter, I would dispute Professor Merrill’s characterization of 
Justice Scalia’s opinion.  It is true that Printz does not simply restate Justice 
O’Connor’s “clear theory” of government accountability from New York v. 
United States,101 which Professor Merrill apparently prefers.  Justice Scalia, 
however, makes a significant contribution to the doctrine in the “many pages” 
that he spends “arguing against the proposition that the anti-commandeering 
 
 91. Id. at 732. 
 92. Id. at 731.  Giving agents of Congress such power would undermine an important feature 
of the constitutional structure.  As John Manning has explained, “textualism should be understood 
as a means of implementing a central and increasingly well-settled element of the separation of 
powers—the prohibition against legislative self-delegation.”  Id. at 675. 
 93. Id. at 732. 
 94. See United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 444 (1988) (relying on a Senate report to 
confirm “[a] leading purpose” of the statute). 
 95. Merrill, supra note 1, at 614. 
 96. Id. at 617. 
 97. Id. at 614. 
 98. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 99. Merrill, supra note 1, at 614. 
 100. Id. at 615. 
 101. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
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principle of New York is contrary to historical practice and understandings.”102  
Professor Merrill disparages Justice Scalia’s reliance on “historical practice 
and understanding,” but this inquiry is crucial in commandeering cases because 
the constitutional text is silent on the matter.103  Thus, Justice Scalia’s focus on 
history was not only appropriate, but essential, to proper resolution of the 
question presented in Printz. 
Professor Merrill also points to Justice Scalia’s reliance on other aspects of 
the constitutional structure in Printz as evidence of strategic behavior.  He 
argues that Justice Scalia “attempt[ed] to re-ground the anti-commandeering 
principle in the separation of powers doctrine of the unitary executive.”104  In 
Professor Merrill’s view, such reliance on the separation of powers reveals 
Justice Scalia’s “desire to use federalism cases to achieve other ends.”105  
Professor Merrill’s argument rests on the false assumption that there is no 
logical connection between the Constitution’s separation of powers and 
federalism.  In fact, many of the Supreme Court’s most significant separation 
of powers decisions also safeguard federalism by preventing each branch of the 
federal government from circumventing federal lawmaking procedures 
designed to constrain federal action.106  Thus, if commandeering undermines 
the federal separation of powers, then that conclusion constitutes crucial 
evidence in determining whether the Constitution’s otherwise ambiguous 
provisions affirmatively authorize Congress to commandeer the states. 
Professor Merrill next cites Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. 
United States ex rel. Stevens107 as an example of Justice Scalia’s “desire to use 
federalism cases to achieve other ends.”108  He states that the Court took the 
case in order to resolve a circuit conflict over “whether the Eleventh 
Amendment bars an action against a state by an individual bringing a qui tam 
suit in the name of the United States.”109  After finding Article III standing, 
however, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion avoided the Eleventh Amendment 
question by interpreting the term “persons” in the False Claims Act not to 
 
 102. Merrill, supra note 1, at 615. 
 103. Clark, supra note 76, at 1195 (noting that with respect to commandeering “all potentially 
relevant provisions of the constitutional text . . . are ambiguous in the sense that they neither 
expressly confer nor expressly deny congressional power to take the challenged action”). 
 104. Merrill, supra note 1, at 615. 
 105. Id.  Justice Scalia also relied on the unitary executive to deny standing in Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).  Using Professor Merrill’s reasoning, such reliance 
would constitute evidence that Justice Scalia voted strategically to deny standing in order to 
further a distinct separation of powers agenda. 
 106. Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 
1321, 1326 (2001). 
 107. 529 U.S. 765 (2000). 
 108. Merrill, supra note 1, at 615. 
 109. Id. 
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include states.  Professor Merrill finds it telling that in so doing Justice Scalia 
managed not to “say anything about federalism at all.”110 
Professor Merrill fails to recognize, however, that the clear-statement 
requirement employed in cases like Vermont Agency itself constitutes an 
important doctrine designed to safeguard federalism.  According to Justice 
Scalia, the Court’s reading of the False Claims Act was buttressed by the rule 
that “‘if Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between 
States and the Federal Government, it must make its intention to do so 
unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’”111  In support of this 
proposition, Justice Scalia cited Gregory v. Ashcroft,112 a case written by 
Justice O’Connor and generally counted among the Rehnquist Court’s 
significant federalism decisions.  The clear-statement requirement applied in 
such cases protects the governance prerogatives of the states by upholding state 
law unless “Congress actually considered—and proceeded to enact into law—a 
proposal that threatens state prerogatives.”113  In other words, the doctrine 
ensures that the federal government incurs the decision costs imposed by 
federal lawmaking procedures—costs designed in large measure to preserve 
the states’ ability to govern their own affairs.114 
III.  SCALIA’S STRATEGY 
Given that Professor Merrill’s “internal strategic actor” hypothesis lacks 
meaningful support, one must look elsewhere to explain Justice Scalia’s 
approach in federalism cases.  Justice Scalia is an “originalist” when it comes 
to constitutional interpretation.  The original Constitution “establishes a 
structure of government with two main features—federalism and separation of 
powers.”115  Professor Merrill assumes that separation of powers and 
federalism are mutually exclusive doctrines—that is, that commitment to one 
somehow precludes enthusiasm for the other.  The Founders, by contrast, 
viewed these doctrines as mutually reinforcing features of the constitutional 
structure designed to serve the same ends.  As James Madison explained: 
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is 
first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to 
each subdivided among distinct and separate departments.  Hence a double 
security arises to the rights of the people.116 
 
 110. Id. at 616. 
 111. Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 787 (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 
58, 65 (1989)). 
 112. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
 113. Clark, supra note 106, at 1427. 
 114. Id. at 1338-46. 
 115. Clark, supra note 76, at 1161. 
 116. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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Justice Scalia supports federalism for the same reason that he embraces the 
separation of powers.  Both doctrines are integral parts of the original 
constitutional plan to preserve individual liberty.117 
Justice Scalia generally takes an “‘originalist’ approach to constitutional 
interpretation.”118  This approach attempts “to establish the meaning of the 
Constitution, in 1789,” by “examining various evidence, including not only, of 
course, the text of the Constitution and its overall structure, but also the 
contemporaneous understanding” of the Founders, the background reflected in 
the English constitution, and the understanding revealed by “the various state 
constitutions in existence when the federal Constitution was adopted.”119  
Justice Scalia acknowledges both “that historical research is always difficult 
and sometimes inconclusive,”120 and that “almost every originalist would 
adulterate it with the doctrine of stare decisis.”121  In the end, however, Justice 
Scalia concludes that originalism is “more compatible with the nature and 
purpose of a Constitution in a democratic system” than nonoriginalism.122  
Thus, if one seeks to predict Justice Scalia’s resolution of constitutional 
questions, the best indicator is likely to be the original understanding of the 
Constitution. 
With respect to separation of powers, for example, Justice Scalia adheres 
closely to the Founders’ view that “the preservation of liberty requires that the 
three great departments of power should be separate and distinct.”123  The 
Founders believed the legislative department to be the most dangerous threat to 
 
 117. Madison also linked federalism, separation of powers, and individual liberty at the 
Virginia Convention: 
Consider fully the principles of the Government.  The sum of the powers given up by the 
people of Virginia is divided into two classes.  One to the Federal and the other to the 
State Government.  Each is subdivided in three branches.  These may be kept independent 
of each other in the one as well as the other.  In this system they are as distinct as is 
consistent with good policy.  This, in my opinion, instead of diminishing, increases the 
security of liberty more than any Government that ever was.  For the powers of 
Government which in every other country are given to one body, are here given to two; 
and are favourable to public liberty. 
Debates of the Virginia Convention (June 14, 1788), in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1258, 1295 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 
1993). 
 118. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 851-52 (1989). 
 119. Id. at 852. 
 120. Id. at 864. 
 121. Id. at 861. 
 122. Id. at 862. 
 123. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  See also 
Agrippa XVI, MASS. GAZETTE, Feb. 5, 1788, reprinted in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 863, 864 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino 
eds., 1998) (“It is now generally understood, that it is for the security of the people, that the 
powers of the government should be lodged in different branches.”). 
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the constitutional separation of powers.  As Madison explained: “Its 
constitutional powers being at once more extensive, and less susceptible of 
precise limits, [the legislature] can, with greater facility, mask, under 
complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes on the 
co-ordinate departments.”124  Given this understanding, it should come as no 
surprise that Justice Scalia has voted to invalidate congressional attempts to 
usurp or interfere with the constitutional functions assigned to the executive 
and judicial branches. 
Two cases illustrate Justice Scalia’s approach.  In Morrison v. Olson,125 
Justice Scalia voted to invalidate the Independent Counsel statute because it 
interfered with the President’s ability to control the execution of federal law.  
In his now-classic dissent, Justice Scalia stressed that “[t]he purpose of the 
separation and equilibration of powers in general, and of the unitary Executive 
in particular, was not merely to assure effective government but to preserve 
individual freedom.”126  Thus, he refused to go along with the majority’s “ad 
hoc approach to constitutional adjudication,” preferring “to rely upon the 
judgment of the wise men who constructed our system, and of the people who 
approved it, and of two centuries of history that have shown it to be sound.”127  
Similarly, in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,128 Justice Scalia invalidated a 
congressional attempt to reopen judicial judgments after they had become 
final.  Speaking on behalf of the Court, Justice Scalia explained that the 
Founders “lived among the ruins of a system of intermingled legislative and 
judicial powers,”129 and, therefore, crafted Article III to give “the Federal 
Judiciary the power, not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them.”130 
The Founders also believed that federalism—like separation of powers—
would safeguard liberty.  As Alexander Hamilton explained: 
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government will at 
all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments, and 
these will have the same disposition towards the general government.  The 
people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it 
 
 124. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 310 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 125. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 126. Id. at 727 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 127. Id. at 734.  See also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413  (1989) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (urging invalidation of binding sentencing “guidelines” promulgated by the United 
States Sentencing Commission because there is “no place within our constitutional system for an 
agency created by Congress to exercise no governmental power other than the making of laws”). 
 128. 514 U.S. 211 (1995). 
 129. Id. at 219. 
 130. Id. at 218-19. 
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preponderate.  If their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of the 
other as the instrument of redress.131 
Justice Scalia’s embrace of constitutional federalism is not only consistent 
with, but affirmatively complements, his commitment to the separation of 
powers.  For example, in his first major federalism opinion in 1989, Justice 
Scalia expressly tied state sovereign immunity to the preservation of individual 
liberty.  In an opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor, 
and Justice Kennedy, Justice Scalia identified the principle of state sovereign 
immunity as “an essential element of the constitutional checks and 
balances.”132  Such immunity, he explained, serves to maintain the 
“constitutionally mandated balance of power between the States and the 
Federal Government” and thus implements the Founders’ intent “to ensure the 
protection of our fundamental liberties.”133 
Justice Scalia expressed these same themes again in Printz v. United 
States,134 arguably his most significant federalism opinion on behalf of the 
Supreme Court.  Justice Scalia examined “the original understanding of the 
Constitution”135 in order to determine whether Congress has constitutional 
power to require state executive officers to implement federal commands.  
After surveying the historical record, Justice Scalia examined “the structure of 
the Constitution.”136  He began with the observation that “[a]lthough the States 
surrendered many of their powers to the new Federal Government, they 
retained ‘a residuary and inviolable sovereignty.’”137  Justice Scalia explained 
that “[t]his separation of the two spheres is one of the Constitution’s structural 
protections of liberty.”138  Thus, permitting Congress to impress state executive 
officers into federal service would threaten this feature of the constitutional 
 
 131. THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 181 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  
Delegates to the state ratifying conventions expressed similar views.  As one delegate explained: 
Too much provision cannot be made against a consolidation [of the states].  The state 
governments represent the wishes and feelings and local interests of the people.  They are 
the safe guard and ornament of the constitution—they will protract the period of our 
liberties—they will afford a shelter against the abuse of power, and will be the natural 
avengers of our violated rights. 
Debates of the Massachusetts Convention (Jan. 19, 1788) (statement of Mr. Ames), in 6 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1254, 1256 (John P. 
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 2000). 
 132. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 39 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 133. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 134. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 135. Id. at 910. 
 136. Id. at 918. 
 137. Id. at 918-19 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 245 (J. Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961)). 
 138. Id. at 921. 
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structure—and, hence, individual liberty—by “immeasurably” augmenting the 
power of the federal government at the expense of the states.139 
Contrary to Professor Merrill’s reading,140 Printz reveals that Justice 
Scalia—like the Founding generation—understood federalism and separation 
of powers not as unrelated or contradictory doctrines, but as complementary 
features of the constitutional structure designed to serve the same purpose: the 
preservation of individual liberty.  As he explained in Printz: “‘Just as the 
separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal 
Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one 
branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal 
Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.’”141  
Justice Scalia expressly tied this understanding to that of the Founders by 
quoting Madison’s “double security” passage from The Federalist.142 
Given that Justice Scalia regards both separation of powers and federalism 
as mechanisms for preserving individual liberty, it is perhaps not surprising 
that he voted to reaffirm Hans v. Louisiana143 just one year after the Supreme 
Court decided Morrison v. Olson.144  As discussed, Justice Scalia viewed the 
Court’s decision in Morrison to uphold the Independent Counsel statute as 
inconsistent with the Constitution’s separation of powers, and, hence, a threat 
to individual liberty.145  As Professor Merrill points out, when Justice Scalia 
first joined the Court in 1986, he seemed “genuinely dubitante on the issue” of 
whether Hans should be overruled.146  Three years later, Justice Scalia resolved 
any doubts by reference to “the original meaning of the Constitution” and stare 
decisis.147  In voting to reaffirm Hans, Justice Scalia undoubtedly sought to 
uphold the Constitution’s structural protection of individual liberty.  Having 
seen the Court disregard the separation of powers in Morrison just a year 
earlier, Justice Scalia may have been especially eager to preserve federalism, 
the other principal feature of the constitutional structure “adopted by the 
Framers to ensure the protection of our fundamental liberties.”148 
 
 139. Printz, 521 U.S. at 922. 
 140. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text. 
 141. Printz, 521 U.S. at 921 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)). 
 142. Id. at 922.  See supra text accompanying note 116. 
 143. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
 144. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 145. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text. 
 146. Merrill, supra note 1, at 611. 
 147. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 34 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 148. Id. at 39 (internal quotations omitted). 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
Justice Scalia’s commitment to the original understanding of the 
Constitution naturally leads him to embrace both federalism and separation of 
powers.  Each doctrine is an essential feature of the original constitutional plan 
to prevent tyranny and safeguard individual liberty.  Thus, it is entirely 
foreseeable that Justice Scalia—a self-described originalist—would seek to 
implement both features of the original constitutional structure.  One might 
legitimately question the correctness of Justice Scalia’s votes in particular 
cases, but the record simply does not support Professor Merrill’s thesis that 
these votes were not sincerely cast.  By embracing both federalism and 
separation of powers, Justice Scalia has simply attempted to uphold Madison’s 
assurance that in “the compound republic of America,” “a double security 
arises to the rights of the people.”149 
 
 149. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 12, at 291. 
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